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WHAT DO BUDDHISTS HOPE FOR FROM 
ANTITHEISTIC ARGUMENT? 
Paul J. Griffiths 
This essay begins by distinguishing an argument's validity from its cogency, 
and emphasizing the importance for understanding particular philosophers of 
knowing how they saw both matters (I). It then gives an introduction to the 
views of Mok:;;akaragupta, an Indian Buddhist philosopher, on both these 
matters (II-III), and an analysis of his rebuttals of arguments for God's exis-
tence, and his arguments against the possibility of God's existence (IV). It con-
cludes by showing that these arguments, though taken to be valid by 
Mok:;;akaragupta, were not intended by him to be persuasive; it suggests, also, 
that this is a typical feature of such arguments. 
I The Persuasive Power of Argument 
There is now a fairly substantial secondary literature on scholastic Indian 
Buddhist argumentation about the existence and nature of isvara, of God. l 
Most of it concentrates upon the formalities and technicalities of the argu-
ments. These are of course extremely important and their careful exposi-
tion and critical analysis is still at its relatively early stages: perhaps it will 
require another generation or two of work before exploration and use of 
these arguments have become part of the ordinary practice of the philoso-
phy of religion in the West. But there are other fundamental questions 
about these arguments scarcely yet asked at all. One of these is: What per-
suasive power did those who developed and used these arguments take 
them to have? What was hoped for from their use? This is a question about 
what Indian Buddhists thought their arguments might achieve. Associated 
with it is a further question: Were they right to think what they thought 
about this? I'll address both these questions in what follows. 
An argument's validity is not the same as its cogency; if an argument is 
valid it need not be cogent, and if cogent it need not be valid. It will there-
fore generally be important in philosophical discussion to know how the 
relation between the two is understood by participants. It is possible to 
think that good philosophical arguments (valid ones with true premises) 
have (or ought to have) a lot of cogency, a lot of persuasive power; if you 
think this then you may think, as Robert Nozick puts it (though without 
endorsing the view), that such arguments 
... force you to a conclusion [because 1 if you believe the premisses you 
have to or must believe the conclusion ... A philosophical argument is 
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an attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants to 
believe it or not ... philosophers need arguments so powerful they set 
up reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the con-
clusion, he dics. 2 
This is the knockdown argument. A valid argument of this sort (there 
aren't any, of course) has maximal persuasive power. A valid argument 
taken to have somewhat less persuasive power might be thought to convict 
those presented with it and capable of understanding it of irrationality if 
they don't accept its conclusions. Some might think that textbook illustra-
tions of modus poncns are like this. A valid argument taken to have less 
power still might be thought to make the acceptance of its conclusions 
plausible (or possible, or some such), but not to make such acceptance nec-
essary for the preservation of rationality. Perhaps arguments about ethical 
questions are typically like this. And a valid argument taken to have rela-
tively little persuasive power might be thought convincing or useful only 
to those who already, and independently, accept its conclusions. 
Arguments in macroeconomics might usefully be so understood, since 
they seem to persuade no one of anything. 
When someone offers you an argument, then, it's important to under-
stand what persuasive power they take it to have. If you think they take it 
to have maximal persuasive power and yet your brain doesn't explode 
upon not accepting it, you're likely to think that the argument has failed. 
But perhaps those who offer it to you take it to have much less power than 
this, and take your rejection of it if you don't already (and independently) 
take its conclusions to be true as entirely consonant with the argument's 
success (and with its validity and the truth of its premises). Or perhaps you 
judge an argument you're offered to have succeeded because it has made 
its conclusions plausible or attractive to you; but then it turns out that its 
propounders understand it to be much more persuasive than this, and take 
it to have failed because you don't find yourself compelled on pain of irra-
tionality to accept its conclusions as true. 
These points suggest that philosophical understanding (and productive 
philosophical engagement) require knowing not only what arguments 
someone offers, but what understanding of argument is implicit in such 
offerings. And it's just here that more questions need to be asked about 
Indian Buddhist anti theistic argumentation. What p~rsuasive p0'Yer did 
the scholastics (Vasubandhu, Bhavya, DharmakJ:rti, Santarak:;;ita, Santide-
va, Kamalaslla, JfJ.anasrl, RatnakIrti, to call only the more famous names on 
the roll) who propounded such arguments take them to have? It's very 
easy for late-twentieth-century western interpreters of the texts in which 
these arguments are found to abstract them from their context (and most 
often the context is a compendium intended principally for the training of 
Buddhist monks who already and independently take the arguments' con-
clusions to be true, not one of argumentative engagement with opponents) 
and assess them as though they were understood to have (and ought be 
understood by us to have) a high degree of persuasive power on the model 
of (say) Spinoza's demonstrationes in the Ethica. But perhaps the arguments 
were not (or not always) so understood. 
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In this paper I'll try to shed some preliminary light on the question of 
what persuasive power Indian Buddhist scholastics took their antitheistic 
arguments to have. This will involve saying something about what those 
arguments were like, but providing exposition of that sort will remain sec-
ondary to exploration of the former question. I'll proceed by looking at one 
work by a late Indian Buddhist thinker, Mok\O(s)akaragupta. 
IT Mok?fikaragupta and the Tarkabhfi?ii 
We know relatively little about Moki?akaragupta's life, but it is probable 
that he lived in Bengal in the late eleventh or early twelfth century and that 
he was a Buddhist monk learned not only ilL Buddhist philosophical litera-
ture but also in that of the nonbuddhist schools. This means that he lived 
at the end of the period in which Indian Buddhists were composing 
scholastic works in Sanskrit. After the beginning of the thirteenth century 
the institutional context that had made such activity possible largely 
ceased to exist in India (the monastery with which Moki?akaragupta was 
connected was probably destroyed by Muslims in 1202).3 
Moki?akaragupta's surviving work suggests that he was not a particular-
ly original thinker, and (as with most Buddhist tlUnkers) that he would 
have taken it as a compliment not to be so regarded. The central purpose 
professed by most such thinkers was the handing on, without change or 
damage, of a tradition of reasoning they had received from their teachers: 
The work upon which I'll comment is called Tarkabhii?fi in Sanskrit, which 
might be translated A Description of Logic, or (possibly) The Language of 
Logic.5 It is an introductory work, intended for monks beginning the study 
of tarka, which term covers parts of what we call epistemology, parts of 
what we call formal logic, and parts of what we (used to) call dialectics. 
Mok::;akaragupta says of his own work that it is intended to elucidate 
the thought of Dharmaklrti (a figure of numinous importance in the histo-
ry of Buddhist theorizing about tarka; he predates Mok::;akaragupta by four 
or five hundred years) for young students of small intelligence." It does not 
presuppose any extensive or precise knowledge of the topics it treats, and 
does not provide detailed treatment of controversial questions within those 
topics. Instead, it introduces students to the main divisions of the subject 
(tarka), to the technical terms deployed by those composing within its 
bounds, and to the main positions taken. It is an introductory lexicon and 
doxography, not too unlike the introductory textbooks used in our institu-
tions of higher education. This makes it in many respects ideal for my pur-
poses because it provides a conspectus of the basics of tarkl7 (of its cate-
gories and subdivisions, of the intellectual equipment needed to do further 
work in it), and can reasonably be taken as giving what were then general-
ly agreed to be the fundamentals of the discipline. Since (inevitably) much 
of it is concerned to set out for the novice a useful taxonomy of the sub-
ject's topics, it provides material on the basis of which reasonable general-
izations can be made about what persuasive power arguments in general 
(and, in particular, arguments against God's existence) were taken to have. 
The work has three major subdivisions. The first deals with the nature of 
accurate awareness (samyagjiiiina) and the means or practices (pramfiI)a, 
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which I shall render 'doxastic practice') by which we get it. The second divi-
sion deals with arguments offered to oneself, for one's own benefit 
(svarthanumana). Arguments treated under this head are intended to pro-
vide those who offer them with knowledge about objects or states of affairs 
not directly perceived by the senses. The standard example is that you can 
come to know by the construction of an argument that there is fire on a dis-
tant mountain even when you perceive only smoke because the mountain is 
too distant for you to see or feel the fire. The fire of whose existence you 
come to know is something not directly perceived by the senses. The third 
division of the work deals with arguments made for the benefit of others 
(pararthanumana). These arguments use words (are vocalized, or possibly 
written), and are intended to convince others of things, to produce knowl-
edge in others. That is, they have an argumentatively persuasive purpose, a 
dialectical purpose. The material in both the second and third divisions of 
the work treats matters of logical theory, and the theory is largely the same 
in each case; the difference between them is only that the third division is 
interested in persuasion while the second division is interested in the man-
agement of an individual's noetic structure. I shall not distinguish between 
the divisions in what follows, though obviously questions about persuasive 
power are of most significance for topics treated in the third division. 
I'll now turn to a fairly lengthy exposition of what Moki?akaragupta 
thinks about argument in general as a necessary prolegomenon to a discus-
sion of what he thinks about its persuasive power. 
III Mok$akaragupta 011 Argument 
A valid argument, according to Moki?akaragupta, consists of only two ele-
ments. As he puts it: "For Buddhists, an expression that demonstrates some-
thing has only two members. They are called invariable concomitance and 
presence in the subject."7 The two elements are: (1) all A-possessors have B; (2) 
5 is an A-possessor. The paradigm is (1) All smoke[A]-possessors have fire [B]; 
(2) This mountain [5] possesses smoke. The conclusion, (3) (Hence) This 
mountain [5] has fire [B], is left unexpressed, though it does state the knowl-
edge that is gained through a proper argument for oneself ( svarthanumana; 
this was, recall, the topic of the second division of Mo~akaragupta's work). In 
this formalization, A (smoke) is what Moki?akaragupta calls the liriga, the 
'mark', or the hetu, the 'reason' (other synonyms are sadhana, 'that which 
proves', jiiapaka, 'that which makes known', vyapya, 'that which is to be per-
vaded'). This mark is typically an observable property, and in order for it to be 
properly usable in an argument of this sort, it must have three characteristics. 
First, pak$adharmata, 'presence in the subject'. This means that the 
mark must be present in 5, that smoke must be present in the mountain. 
Moki?akaragupta puts it thus: 
Definite existence of [the mark] is ascertained in the locus to which 
the argument is directed: [This means] that the definite presence of 
the mark is ascertained in the property-possessor (the mountain is an 
example) to which argument is directed. This is one [of the three 
characteristics], and is called 'presence in the subject'.s 
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Second, anvaya, 'positive concomitance'. This means that the mark is 
present only in members of the class to which S belongs, things relevantly 
like S (in this case, all fire-possessors): 
Existence of [the mark] is ascertained only in what is like the subject. 
The expression 'what is like the subject' means 'a thing of the same 
kind'; it indicates those things that, like the subject, possess a proper-
ty indicated in an example [e.g., 'as in a kitchen', which is a fire-pos-
sessor]. This fact, that the mark is ascertained to exist only in what is 
like the subject, is the second [of the three characteristics], and is 
called 'positive concomitance'.9 
Positive concomitance understood in this way does not require that the 
mark be present in all members of the relevant class (that smoke be present 
in all fire-possessors), as Mok~akaragupta goes on to note. For instance, in 
the case of an argument that attempts to use the mark being made by human 
action to prove impermanence, the fact that some impermanent things (e.g., 
lightning) are not so produced does not make the argument invalid. 
Anvaya still obtains in such a case. Positive concomitance requires only 
that the mark not be present in anything not of the relevant class: that no 
non-fire-possessors be smoky. 
And third, vyatireka, 'negative concomitance'. This means that the mark 
is absent in everything that is relevantly unlike S (in this case, all non-fire-
possessors): 
Definite absence of [the mark] is ascertained in what is unlike the 
subject. The expression 'what is unlike the subject' means 'a thing dif-
ferent from the subject'; it is the ascertainment of the definite absence 
therein that is the third [of the three characteristics], and is called 
'negative concomitance' .'0 
This is logically equivalent to the statement of positive concomitance. If all 
As are B (anvaya), then no non-B is A (vyatireka). 
The upshot is that all smoke-possessors are fiery, and that no non-fire-
possessors are smoky. The claim is not that all fire-possessors are smoky 
(this mayor may not be true, but it is not required for positive and nega-
tive concomitance). The absence of B (fire) then guarantees the absence of 
A (smoke); and the presence of A (smoke) guarantees the presence of fire. 
This relation between A and B is otherwise called vyapti, which strictly 
means something like 'pervasion', but which I shall translate, following 
what is now almost a standard rendering, as 'invariable concomitance'. 
Marks that have these three characteristics, and that can as a result be 
deployed in arguments of the relevant sort, are in tum of at least two sorts, 
says Mok~akaragupta. The first is a mark related to that to which it stands 
in a relation of invariable concomitance as effect to cause. The phrase tadut-
patti, 'arising from thaI', labels this kind of relation behveen A and B, and 
the example given is the one I've been using: smoke is the effect of fire, 
which means that it stands in the appropriate causal relation to fire (only 
when fire is present is smoke's presence caused). You typically come to 
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know that such a causal relation obtains by perception (pratyak?a), but this 
does not mean that the relation of tadutpatti is a contingent one. It is, rather, 
necessary: all empirical observations will confirm it, and none can falsify it. 
But A can also be related to B by identity (tadatmya; this is the second 
kind of mark). For instance, when S (this thing in front of me) bears the 
property A, 'being a si1!lsapa' (a kind of tree), which is glossed to mean 
"bearing distinguishing marks such as branches, leaves, color, and 
shape",!' and B is the property 'properly being called a tree', then there is a 
relation of identity between A and B: all si1!lsapas are properly called trees, 
and where there is the absence of the property 'properly being called a 
tree' there is also the absence of the property 'being a si1!lsapa'. Coming to 
know that all A-possessors are also B-possessors in this kind of case does-
n't require having observed instances of causal connection between A and 
B; it requires only knowledge of the proper uses of the term 'tree' (vrk?a).12 
There are interesting difficulties here. The properties being a si1!lsapa 
and being a tree aren't straightforwardly identical (not even in the sense that 
their differences are indiscernible), even though they do stand in a relation 
of invariable concomitance of a noncausal type (that is, possessing the 
property being a siIpsapa doesn't cause you to possess the property being a 
tree). The most likely interpretation of Mok~akaragupta's understanding of 
the tadatmya relation is that he is a realist about universals (although cer-
tainly not in the same way that some nonbuddhist philosophers, such as 
the Naiyayikas, are), which is to say that he thinks universals exist (that the 
property being a tree is not just a product of conceptual activity on our part), 
and that some of them are related to others by necessary concomitance 
(avinabha va) of a noncausal sort. But it is also possible that he is not a real-
ist about universals and thinks of the relations between being a si1!lsapa 
and being a tree as entirely conceptual (i.e., you can't coherently think the 
former without also thinking the latter). Mok~akaragupta doesn't say 
enough to permit a clear decision, and the matter became a topic for debate 
for later Buddhist scholasticism, especially in Tibet. 
Mok~akaragupta recognizes only these two kinds of relations (causal 
relations and identity relations, both of which are necessary), and so only 
two patterns of argument relating A to B. In order to provide a good argu-
ment that A and B have a relation of invariable concomitance, it must be 
shown either that A and B are identical, or that A and B are related causally 
by necessary conditionality. If either can be shown, a good argument (one 
that is valid and has true premises) has thereby been produced. 
Mok~akaragupta is clear that both kinds of relation between A and B (tadat-
my a and tadutpattl) are relations of necessity, and that such a relation must 
be present in an argument in order for demonstration or proof to occur: "It 
is improper to arrive at what you want to prove simply by stating a thesis 
without logical necessity."'" The emphasis on necessity is evident also in 
Mo~akaragupta' s definition of invariable concomitance (vyapb): 
Invariable concomitance is defined as the statement of the necessary 
presence of B when A is present, and the necessary absence of A 
when B is absent. ls 
512 Faith and Philosophy 
All arguments thought of by Mok1?akaragupta as good (valid and pos-
sessed of true premises) employ and require a strong notion of 
sambandha, of logical necessity, and this was one of the main points of dif-
ference between Buddhist logicians and some of their Indian counterparts 
(especially Naiyayikas). The second element in the arguments (S is an A-
possessor, recall) is intended to be uncontroversial and therefore not prob-
lematic so far as persuasion is concerned. It includes theses like 'there's 
smoke on the mountain', or 'I can't see a pot here', or 'this thing in front of 
me has leaves, branches, and a trunk'. And the first element (all A-posses-
sors have B), since it obtains necessarily, is meant to show that one can 
demonstrate that, from the uncontroversial states of affairs mentioned, 
states of affairs such as 'there's fire on the mountain' or 'there's no pot 
here' or 'this thing in front of me is properly called a tree' necessarily fol-
low. It seems at first blush that Mok:;akaragupta thinks of good arguments 
as bearing a high degree of persuasive power. Such arguments purport to 
show that a particular controversial (dubitable) state of affairs must obtain 
if some noncontroversial (indubitable) state of affairs obtains. 
But there is of course a further question. If a good argument deploys as 
one of its central premises a claim about the invariable concomitance of 
two properties, may not disagreement arise about whether in fact such 
concomitance obtains? May there not be discussion as to how it is possible 
to know that such concomitance obtains? Here is what Mok1?akaragupta 
says about that: 
It is the common opinion of all philosophers that what offers proof 
[S's being an A-possessor] certainly must establish what is to be 
proved [S's being a B-possessor] in every case in which a relation of 
invariable concomitance between what offers proof and what is to be 
proved has itself been proved by a doxastic practice that applies uni-
versally.'6 
A "doxastic practice that applies universally" (sarvopasaI!1harapramaI)a) is 
some method of producing judgment (Mok1?akaragupta, like most 
Buddhists, acknowledges only two of these, perception and reasoning or 
argument) that applies to (permits the making of true judgments about) all 
members of the set about which there is discussion. Either perception or 
argument may be used to come to know (to establish, to prove) that a par-
ticular instance of invariable concomitance obtains, though perception is 
used only to establish causal invariable concomitance (technically, the rela-
tion of tadutpattl), while reasoned argument is used to establish invariable 
concomitance entailed by identity (technically, the relation of tadatmya). 
For example, perception may be used to establish the relation of invari-
able concomitance between being smoky and being fiery (recall that this rela-
tion requires that if you're smoky you're fiery and if you're not fiery 
you're not smoky; but not that if you're fiery you're smoky). That this is so 
shows clearly that Mok1?akaragupta takes universals (being fierI) and being 
smoky are both universals; they can equally well be expressed by abstract 
nouns such as fieriness or smokiness, as they often are in Sanskrit) to be per-
ceptible since the relations between them may be established 
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perceptually.1? In establishing the invariable concomitance between these 
universals perceptually, then, you perceive not only the universals but the 
necessary relation between them.l' 
In the case of using reasoned argument to establish a required instance of 
invariable concomitance, a typical pattern of argument is technically called 
"a doxastic practice that rules out the contradictory [of what you want to 
show]" (viparyayabadhakapramal)a). Consider the example of invariable 
concomitance between the universals momentariness (k?a~likatvam) and exis-
tence (sattvam). To show, using the method mentioned, that such concomi-
tance does obtain you must show that the negation of momentariness nec-
essarily rules out existence (this entails that if something exists it is momen-
tary). To put this slightly differently: you must show that denying momen-
tariness to something rules out that thing's existence. Mok$akaragupta's 
instance of this kind of argument begins with the claim if S does not possess 
causal efficacy successively or nonsuccessively, then S does not possess causal effica-
cy at all. lY This means that if a putative existent is capable of bringing some-
thing about, it must be capable of doing this at some particular time (non-
successively), or at a succession of particular times (successively). The next 
claim in. the argument is that neither of these two kinds of efficacy belongs 
to a nonmomentary thing, from which the conclusion follows that a nonmo-
mentary thing can effect nothing, which is the same as to say that such an 
entity does not exist. This final move is permissible given the pan-Buddhist 
axiom that existence (sattvam, astitvam) just means the capacity to bring 
something about causally (arthakriyakaritvam).2(1 
This argument is intended to show that nonmomentariness entails 
nonexistence, which is the same as to show that existence entails momen-
tariness. To show this is to apprehend "by a doxastic practice" (argument) 
"that rules out the contradictory" (the claim that nonmomentariness is 
compatible with existence) the relation of invariable concomitance that is 
supposed to obtain between existing and being momentary. And once this 
invariable concomitance is known it can be deployed in other arguments-
for example, against the idea of a permanent God. 
To this point I've summarized Mok$iikaragupta's understanding of 
argument. Because all the arguments he describes use as their central 
premise a claim about the invariable concomitance of two universals, they 
show (if their premises are true and they are formally valid) their conclu-
sions to be necessary. In this respect the arguments he offers might seem to 
be taken by him to bear something like the maximal dialectical force sug-
gested by the quotation from Nozick with which this paper began. This 
impression is only reinforced by the fact that, when he explains how to 
establish the truth of a claim to universal concomitance, Mok$akaragupta 
typically offers an argument to show the incoherence of denying such con-
comitance. He is not, on the face of it, interested in probabilistic arguments, 
or arguments by which an interlocutor might reasonably not be convinced. 
But, of course, there is a difference between the claim that an argument (if 
it is good) ineluctably demonstrates its conclusions, and the claim that all 
who do not recognize it to be good are thereby irrational (or, in the extreme 
case, subject to death by brain-implosion) if the goodness of the argument 
is denied. The former is a claim about the logical properties of a particular 
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type of argument (and Mok;;akaragupta both makes it and should make it 
about the kinds of argument he describes). The latter is a claim about the 
persuasive power of a particular type of argument (and it is less clear 
whether he would or should make it, either about the kinds of argument 
he offers, or indeed about any). 
To shed some further light on this question of what Mok~akaragupta 
thinks about the dialectical (as distinct from the logical) force of argument, 
I'll now turn to his anti theistic arguments. These provide a relatively 
detailed instance of what looks like dialectical engagement; an examination 
of them should permit some tentative suggestions about the central ques-
tion of this paper: just what was Mok~akaragupta hoping for from the 
antitheistic arguments he deployed? 
IV Moktjakaragupta on Arguments About Cod (isvara) 
Mok~akaragupta offers antitheistic argument at two places in the 
TarkabMtja. In the first he offers a rebuttal of a traditional Naiyayika argu-
ment that purports to demonstrate the existence of God; in the second he 
offers a positive argument of his own whose conclusion is that God cannot 
exist. I'll take these in turn. 
The theistic Naiyayika argument rebutted by Mok~akaragupta (81-83) 
rests upon a classification of existents into three and only three kinds: those 
that have definitely been produced by an agent or agents (because such an 
agent is seen about his work); those that have definitely not been so pro-
duced (the example given here is vyoma, the sky or the atmosphere, which 
on the view being discussed here is not an effect: it has no beginning in 
time, no set of conditions that brought it into existence); and those about 
which it is doubtful whether they've been so produced because no agent 
has been seen to produce them (the examples given are ancient trees, 
vanaspati, and the earth, k$itl). In its simplest form the Naiyayika argu-
ment says: (1) All effects are produced by an intelligent agent (they are 
buddhimatkartrka); (2) Existents of the third kind (those about which it's 
initially doubtful whether they've been produced by an agent) are effects 
(they have the property of karyatva). From which it follows that they must 
have been produced by an intelligent agent, and since such an agent can-
not be human, it must be divine. 
The relation of invariable concomitance that powers this argument is 
said to obtain between being an effect and being made by an intelligent agent. If 
something has the former property it must have the latter; and (equivalent-
ly) if it lacks the latter it lacks the former. According to Nyaya cosmology (I 
oversimplify here, but not in such a way as to compromise the discussion 
to follow), the only thing that lacks the property being all effect is the 
sky / atmosphere; therefore, everything else (humans, animals, trees, the 
planet earth, and so on) possesses both the properties in question. 
But how is the relation of invariable concomitance between being an 
effect and being made by an intelligent agent known? The Naiyayikas say that 
it is known by a synthetic mental act (a judgment) based on repeated past 
perceptions of such a relation.21 You've seen lots of clay pots (the favorite 
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example of an effect) in the past, and you've observed that they are made 
by potters (intelligent agents). You then judge that a causal relation obtains 
between being 1111 effect and being made by an intelligent agent of just the same 
kind as the one that obtains between being smoky and being fiery. 
Mok~akaragupta's response to this argument asks whether the agent 
referred to in the property being made by an intelligent agent is supposed to 
have a body or not. If the agent is embodied, it will follow that the agent 
ought to be visible. But in that case, says Mok~akaragupta, the argument 
exhibits the logical fault of the shared mark (the sadhara1)ahetu)-the mark 
in this argument, recall, is being an effect. Suppose you're trying to prove 
sound is permanent, and you do so by saying all objects of cognition are perma-
nent and sound is an object of cognition. Your mark is then being al1 object of 
cognition. If we follow the definitions given earlier (of 'presence in the sub-
ject', 'positive concomitance', and 'negative concomitance') it ought to be 
the case that this mark does not belong to anything impermanent. If it 
does, then there is no relation of invariable concomitance between the 
mark and the property whose presence it is supposed to prove (in the case 
of the example at hand, being permanent). But in fact the mark in question is 
found in all sorts of impermanent things, such as pots. The mark is there-
fore too widely shared: it cannot do the logical and persuasive work 
required of it. The same is true, says Mok~akaragupta, of the mark being an 
effect. This is too widely shared because it belongs to things that we know 
have no visible (embodied) intelligent agent as their maker. The example 
he gives here is that of grass: we see it come into being and yet we don't 
see an intelligent agent producing it. If there were such an agent, and the 
agent had a body, we would see it. It follows that the theistic argument 
fails if it deploys the mark being an effect to demonstrate the presence of the 
property being made by an intelligent embodied agent. 
But of course God (and fsvara) need not be thought of as embodied, and 
perhaps usually are not. So maybe the argument means to use the mark 
being an effect to demonstrate the presence of the property being made by an 
intelligent disembodied agent. But in this case, says Mok~akaragupta, the 
argument exhibits the fallacy called sandigdhavipak~avyavrtti, "doubt 
about the exclusion [of the mark] from those things relevantly dissimilar to 
the subject." The mark in the theistic argument is being an effect. Given the 
(Naiyayika) threefold classification of existents mentioned above, it should 
be remembered that some things (e.g., the sky/atmosphere) are thought 
not to have been made by an intelligent agent. If the mark is indeed absent 
in all members of the class of things relevantly unlike S, things that possess 
the property not being made by an intelligent disembodied agent, then it ought 
be the case that the mark (being an effect) is absent in, inter alia, the 
sky / atmosphere. But it is not clear that this is the case (says 
Mok~akaragupta), and since this is so it is also not clear that the required 
relation between being an effect and being made by an intelligent disembodied 
agent obtains. Perhaps the sky, although not produced by an agent, is 
nonetheless an effect or product of agentless causes; it may be that it is not 
an effect at all, but this is not known. If this criticism is right, then formal 
invalidity applies also to the theistic argument construed as having to do 
with a disembodied agent. 
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The upshot of these criticisms, in Mok~akaragupta's mind, is that the 
Naiyayika theistic argument fails formally on the only two possible readings 
of itY It does not demonstrate that all effects are made by an intelligent 
agent, whether or not that agent is thought of as embodied.23 Further, the fail-
ure has to do precisely (and not surprisingly) with doubt about the truth of 
the argument's central claim, which is that possessing the property being an 
effect entails possessing the property being made by an intelligent agent. As 
Mok~akaragupta puts it by way of summary: "The logical relation between 
the two, whether one of causal necessity, of identity, or some other such as 
essential nature/4 has not been proved by a prior reliable doxastic practice."25 
So much for Mok~akaragupta's rebuttal of a positive argument for 
Cod's existence. TI1e upshot of the rebuttal is only that no successful argu-
ment has been offered for an invariable-concomitance relation that would 
establish Cod's existence. Doubt remains as to whether the required rela-
tion in fact obtains, and it is a doubt that has to do with a matter of fact (is 
the atmosphere an effect or not?) rather than a matter of logic. This, it 
seems, is not a strong rebuttal. A Naiyayika debater could well respond 
that, as a matter of fact, the atmosphere is not an effect, in which case the 
invariable concomitance between not being made by an intelligent agent and 
not being an effect remains. And a non-Naiyayika theist (or anyone not com-
mitted to the idiosyncrasies of Nyaya cosmology) could provide the 
proverbial barren woman's son as an instance of something not made by 
an intelligent agent and also not an effect (because not an existent at all). 
These strategies are not pursued in the text, however. 
Mo~akaragupta's rejection of theism is not limited to showing that posi-
tive theistic arguments fail. He also offers a positive argument of his own 
whose conclusion is that Cod cannot exist. Consider, he says, the claim that 
everything has been made by an intelligent agent. Suppose, then, that such 
an agent is permanent (nitya). If this is the case then the agent's capacity to 
bring about effects (to act in such a way that the results he desires occur) 
would also be permanent, for a capacity of this kind is an essential property 
of an agent (or, if you prefer, is part of the definition of an agent). In the case 
of a divine agent (an eternal and omnipotent agent) there is nothing at any 
time that does or could obstruct or prevent the effects of divine agency from 
occurring. But one of the things that divine agency brings about (according 
to the view that Mok~akaragupta wants to reject) is creation (sarga) of the 
cosmos; another is destruction (pralaya) of the cosmos.26 It follows, absurd-
ly, that at every time the cosmos is being both created and destroyed, for the 
divine agent would always be both creating and destroying it. 
This argument proposes a relation of invariable concomitance between 
being an eternal and omnipotent agent at t (where t is some particular time) 
and actualizing one's agential capacity at t. It moves from this proposed rela-
tion by reductio (prasariga, the demonstration of an absurd entailment) to 
the conclusion that there cannot be an eternal, omnipotent agent whose 
capacities include creation and destruction. And since such an agent would 
be Cod (Isvara), it follows that there cannot be Cod. 
Mok~akaragupta cites two possible responses to this argument. The first 
is that the fact that all of Cod's agential capacities are not actualized at 
every time is explicable by the absence at some times (and presence at oth-
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ers) of auxiliary or secondary causes (sahakarin). But this would make sec-
ondary causes independent of God, and this conclusion ought to be unac-
ceptable to theists for other reasons. 
But suppose, says the theist, that the temporal separation of some of 
God's acts from others is to be explained precisely by the fact that He is 
intelligent, possessed of volition, and chooses to do one thing at one time 
and another at another, even though He could have done all things at all 
times?2H Mok$akaragupta's response to this is to say that if such temporally-
indexed choices are part of God's nature,29 then it remains inexplicable why 
He sometimes has them and sometimes does not; the principle assumed 
here is that if some property is essential to you, you cannot have it only 
sometimes. And, obviously, if the temporally-indexed choices mentioned 
by the opponent are not essential properties of God, then their occurrence at 
a particular time must be causally dependent upon things other than God, 
and this takes the debate back to the claim (mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph) that some secondary causes are indeed independent of God. 
The principle underlying the proposed invariable concomitance 
between being an omnipotent agent at t and actualizing one's agential capacity 
at t is one that Mok$akaragupta attributes to Dharmaklrti: that change is 
not predicable of an eternal entity's essential properties. If it were, the 
putative eternal entity would precisely not be eternal because it would at 
some times lack at least one of its essential properties.3() 
This argument raises deep and interesting philosophical questions, 
among which are: Is it coherent to say that there are temporally-indexed 
properties of the kind is potentially nz? Can it reasonably be said that an 
entity free of change possesses such properties? Can an entity free of 
change be related causally to temporally-indexed things or events? 
Mok$akaragupta's positive argument for God's nonexistence doesn't 
demonstrate that a negative answer ought to be given to all these ques-
tions. Rather, it assumes such an answer in proposing invariable concomi-
tance between being an omnipotent agent at t and actualizing one's agentia7 
capacity at t. 
V The Persuasive Power of Argument: Reprise 
Mok$akaragupta's antitheistic arguments (and those offered by Indian 
Buddhists generally) were not persuasively effective: those to whom they 
were offered (Naiyayikas and other Hindu theists) were not convinced by 
them to abandon theism. Similarly, the theistic arguments offered by 
Naiyayikas and others suffered from dialectical failure: their nontheistic 
interlocutors (Buddhists and others) were not persuaded by them to 
become theists. Both Buddhists and Naiyayikas were, of course, aware that 
their arguments failed dialectically in these ways. Why then did they per-
sist in offering them? What, to return to the question of my title, did they 
hope for from them? 
The persuasive failures of these arguments do not mean that all (or 
indeed any) of them are formally invalid, or lack true premises, or suffer 
from some other tedmical fault. Neither does it mean that those on one side 
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or the other were too stupid or sinful properly to understand the arguments 
they were being offered (though of course stupidity and sin were not less 
widely distributed in medieval India than they are in contemporary 
America, which means that there must have been many Buddhists and 
Naiyayikas afflicted by them to the point of being incapable of understand-
ing or using argument). Rather, the reasons for persuasive failure are deeper, 
more interesting, and of more general application, or so I shall now argue. 
Recall that Mokf;iakaragupta offers two kinds of antitheistic argument. 
The first is negative and responsive: it attempts to show that an opponent's 
positive argument for God's existence fails, and tries to do this by using 
nothing other than the terms of that opponent's argument. It works, that is, 
largely by reductio or prasaliga. The second is positive and attempts to 
show in its own terms that God cannot exist. While both kinds of argument 
usually fail persuasively, the former does so less often and less drastically 
than the latter, and the reasons for failure are somewhat different in each 
case. It therefore makes sense to treat them separately. 
If you offer an argument of any sort and you're faced with a rejection of 
it that shows (or attempts to show) that your argument fails in its own 
terms (a prasariga argument in Mok~akaragupta's terms), you may of 
course ignore the rejection; but if you do pay attention to it your response 
is almost certain to belong to one or another of the following three kinds. 
First, you may object that the opponent's understanding and restatement 
of your argument is faulty, and that as a result the proposed reductio does-
n't work. Second, you may acknowledge that the opponent has understood 
your argument well, that the difficulty indicated is genuine, but that the 
argument can be readjusted in such a way that it no longer exhibits it. 
Third, you may agree that the reductio is a success, judge that the argu-
ment cannot be salvaged, and therefore abandon it. The first and second 
responses may overlap in various ways: you may wish to say that the 
opponent has misunderstood your argument, but your restatement of it 
may nonetheless alter it in response to the criticism even if such alteration 
is not (for polemical or face-saving reasons) acknowledged. 
In the case of Mokf;iakaragupta's prasariga argument summarized 
above, responses of these sorts might require from Naiyayikas an assertion 
that Mok~akaragupta has misunderstood what they think about the 
sky / atmosphere, and that as a result the logical fallacy he indicates does 
not hold (a version of the first response); or that the argument can be made 
to hold by altering what has heretofore been said about the sky / atmos-
phere (a version of the second response); or that at least this version of the 
argument from being an effect to being made by a rational agent has to be 
dropped. There is some evidence in Nyaya thought of responses one and 
two (though it's beyond the scope of this essay to survey it), and little or 
none of response three (which is scarcely surprising). But notice that not 
even the third response requires dropping the view that there is in fact a 
relation of invariable concomitance between being an effect and being made 
by an intelligent agent; it requires only abandonment of a particular argu-
ment deploying that relation. 
Prasariga arguments seem likely in principle to have some dialectical 
effect (and seem actually to have had some in the history of Indian debate 
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about God): they are likely at least to prompt further attention to and fine-
tuning of arguments already in play. They may even occasionally result in 
the abandonment of particular arguments. But they are not likely to (and as 
a matter of fact do not) result either in the abandonment of the thesis for 
which the criticized argument argues (in this case the claim that existents not 
seen to have been made by an intelligent agent have in fact been so made), or in the 
abandonment of the view that there is a relation of universal concomitance 
(in this case between being an effect and being made by an intelligent agent) that 
indicates the truth of such a claim. It is therefore in prasarlga arguments that 
what limited dialectical effectiveness there is may be found. 
The failure to persuade of the second kind of antitheistic argument pre-
sented by Mok:;;akaragupta (the positive argument whose conclusion is 
that God cannot exist) is deeper and more interesting. Its failure is largely 
attributable to the fact that it (and other arguments like it) always and nec-
essarily axiomatically assume and deploy the truth of complex claims in 
metaphysics, epistemology, or logic (or all three). Such axiomatic assump-
tions are, by definition, not explicitly thematized or argued for as part of 
the argument; they are, instead, among the implicit requirements for the 
argument's validity. Assumptions of this kind may themselves become an 
explicit topic of argument, but when they do the arguments about them 
will then in tum deploy some (but now different) axiomatic assumptions. 
Further, such axiomatic assumptions are almost always not self-evidently 
true, which is to say that they may reasonably not be assented to; and yet 
assent to them is required in order for the argument to be persuasive. The 
absence of such assent, even in the face of an argument's formal validity, 
makes the argument fail as a tool of persuasion. 
In the case of Mok:;;akaragupta's argument for God's necessary nonexis-
tence, an invariable concomitance between being an eternal and omnipotent 
agent at t (where t is some particular time) and actualizing one's agential capac-
ity at t is assumed and proposed. Mok:;;akaragupta acknowledges, as 
already shown, that any particular proposed instance of invariable con-
comitance may itself become a matter for question (for if the proposed rela-
tion is not actuat any argument that deploys it will fail), and that when it is 
questioned it ought to be shown to obtain by appeal to either perception or 
reasoning. But here is the rub. As I've already suggested, any attempt to 
show that this particular instance of invariable concomitance obtains will 
require appeal to (and argument about) such interesting matters (among 
many others) as the status of properties like is potentially m (and of an ontol-
ogy that goes with asserting or denying the possibility of such properties). 
A perceptive theistic respondent to Mok:;;akaragupta's positive antitheistic 
argument will rapidly see that in order to be persuasive the argument 
requires assent to all sorts of claims that it does not argue for, many of them 
deeply controversial and difficult of resolution. It follows rapidly that it will 
be easy to maintain rationality (not to mention a brain free of mortal rever-
berations) while not being persuaded by such an argument. 
If there is a general principle here (and if this principle is a good one it 
applies to much more than antitheistic arguments propounded by 
Buddhists) it is this: the interest and scope of an argument's conclusion is 
(and ought to be) inversely proportional to that argument's persuasive 
520 Faith and Philosophy 
power. This is why Mok$akaragupta's negative argument as to the failure 
of a Naiyayika theistic argument is more dialectically efficacious than his 
own positive argument for God's necessary nonexistence. After all, there 
are not many theses more interesting or with wider scope than the thesis it 
is incoherent to claim that there is an eternal agent (which is, approximately, 
the upshot of Mok$akaragupta's positive argument). 
It remains to return to the question in this paper's title. Did 
Mok$5karagupta (or did Indian Buddhists generally) have the modest 
expectations that I've argued they ought to have had for the persuasive 
power of their antitheistic arguments? This is not a question that I can yet 
answer clearly, though there are certainly indications in favor of a positive 
answer. Most Buddhist anti theistic argumentation appears to have been 
developed for the purpose of training monks to understand and deploy the 
technicalities of their own tradition, to become skilled practitioners of a cer-
tain mode of intellectual activity. Mok$akaragupta's Tarkabha~a certainly 
has the character of a manual intended for that purpose, as do most of the 
other Indian works in which such arguments are developed. And in so far 
as that is the central purpose of antitheistic argument in the Indian 
Buddhist tradition, persuasive power is hardly relevant at all. But there are 
also indications on the other side, indications that at least some Buddhist 
scholastics engaged themselves directly and deeply with Naiyayika (and 
other nonbuddhist) works, responded to them, and hoped or intended that 
their responses should in turn provoke a response (which they sometimes 
did: Buddhist critiques were among the influences upon the development 
of thought about many things among Naiyayikas, Mimaqlsakas, Jains, and 
many others in India). Even these facts, though, do not require the conclu-
sion that Buddhists had a high evaluation of the persuasive power of their 
antitheistic arguments. My own preliminary judgment (although much 
further empirical work on the uses of argument in Indian scholasticism is 
needed) is that antitheistic argument for Indian Buddhists was principally 
a tool for elaborating, embroidering, and knitting together the conceptual 
fabric of their tradition, and only secondarily (if at all) a device for convinc-
ing anyone of anything. This too is largely what theistic argument has been 
(and ought still to be) for Christians. 
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